As used in sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code:
(A)(1) "Agency" means, except as limited by this division, any official, board, or commission having authority to promulgate rules or make adjudications in the civil service commission, the division of liquor control, the department of taxation, the industrial commission, the bureau of workers' compensation, the functions of any administrative or executive officer, department, division, bureau, board, or commission of the government of the state specifically made subject to sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code, and the licensing functions of any administrative or executive officer, department, division, bureau, board, or commission of the government of the state having the authority or responsibility of issuing, suspending, revoking, or canceling licenses.
Except as otherwise provided in division (I) of this section, sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code do not apply to the public utilities commission. Sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code do not apply to the utility radiological safety board; to the controlling board; to actions of the superintendent of financial institutions and the superintendent of insurance in the taking possession of, and rehabilitation or liquidation of, the business and property of banks, savings and loan associations, savings banks, credit unions, insurance companies, associations, reciprocal fraternal benefit societies, and bond investment companies; to any taken by the division of securities under section 1707.201 [1707.20.1] of the Revised Code; or to any action that may be taken by the superintendent of financial institutions under section 1113.03, 1121.05, 1121.06, 1121.10, 1125.09, 1125.12, 1125.18, 1155.18, 1157.01, 1157.02, 1157.10, 1163.22, 1165.01, 1165.02, 1165.10, 1349.33, 1733.35, 1733.361 [1733.36.1], 1733.37, 1733.412 [1733.41.2], or 1761.03 of the Revised Code.
Sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code do not apply to actions of the industrial commission or the bureau of workers' compensation under sections 4123.01 to 4123.94 of the Revised Code with respect to all matters of adjudication, and to the actions of the industrial commission and bureau of workers' compensation under division (D) of section 4121.32 and sections 4123.29, 4123.34, 4123.341 [4123.34.1], 4123.342 [4123.34.2], 4123.40, 4123.411 [4123.41.1], 4123.44, 4123.442 [4123.44.2],Å and divisions (B), (C), and (E) of section 4131.14 of the Revised Code.
(2) "Agency" also means any official or work unit having authority to promulgate rules or make adjudications in the department of job and family services, but only with respect to both of the following:
(a) The adoption, amendment, or rescission of rules that section 5101.09 of the Revised Code requires be adopted in accordance with this chapter;
(b) The issuance, suspension, revocation, or cancellation of licenses.
(B) "License" means any license, permit, certificate, commission, or charter issued by any agency. "License" does not include any arrangement whereby a person, institution, or entity furnishes medicaid services under a provider agreement with the department of job and family services pursuant to Title XIX of the "Social Security Act," 49 Stat. 620 (1935), 42 U.S.C. 301, as amended.
(C) "Rule" means any rule, regulation, or standard, having a general and uniform operation, adopted, promulgated, and enforced by any agency under the authority of the laws governing such agency, and includes any appendix to a rule. "Rule" does not include any internal management rule of an agency unless the internal management rule affects private rights and does not include any guideline adopted pursuant to section 3301.0714 [3301.07.14] of the Revised Code.
(D) "Adjudication" means the determination by the highest or ultimate authority of an agency of the rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a specified person, but does not include the issuance of a license in response to an application with respect to which no question is raised, nor other acts of a ministerial nature.
(E) "Hearing" means a public hearing by any agency in compliance with procedural safeguards afforded by sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code.
(F) "Person" means a person, firm, corporation, association, or partnership.
(G) "Party" means the person whose interests are the subject of an adjudication by an agency.
(H) "Appeal" means the procedure by which a person, aggrieved by a finding, decision, order, or adjudication of any agency, invokes the jurisdiction of a court.
(I) "Rule-making agency" means any board, commission, department, division, or bureau of the government of the state that is required to file proposed rules, amendments, or rescissions under division (D) of section 111.15 of the Revised Code and any agency that is required to file proposed rules, amendments, or rescissions under divisions (B) and (H) of section 119.03 of the Revised Code. "Rule-making agency" includes the public utilities commission. "Rule-making agency" does not include any state-supported college or university.
(J) "Substantive revision" means any addition to, elimination from, or other change in a rule, an amendment of a rule, or a rescission of a rule, whether of a substantive or procedural nature, that changes any of the following:
(1) That which the rule, amendment, or rescission permits, authorizes, regulates, requires, prohibits, penalizes, rewards, or otherwise affects;
(2) The scope or application of the rule, amendment, or rescission.
(K) "Internal management rule" means any rule, regulation, or standard governing the day-to-day staff procedures and operations within an agency.
HISTORY: GC § 154-62; 120 v 358; 121 v 578; Bureau of Code Revision, 10-1-53; 132 v S 97 (Eff 1-1-68); 133 v H 1 (Eff 3-18-69); 135 v H 366 (Eff 11-22-73); 136 v H 1 (Eff 6-13-75); 136 v H 920 (Eff 10-11-76); 136 v S 545 (Eff 1-17-77); 137 v H 257 (Eff 1-1-78); 138 v H 204 (Eff 7-30-79); 138 v H 403 (Eff 7-1-80); 140 v H 260 (Eff 9-27-83); 140 v H 244 (Eff 7-4-84); 141 v H 201 (Eff 7-1-85); 143 v H 111 (Eff 7-1-89); 144 v H 437 (Eff 4-30-92); 145 v H 695 (Eff 9-29-94); 146 v H 7 (Eff 9-1-95); 146 v S 162 (Eff 10-29-95); 146 v S 293 (Eff 9-26-96); 146 v H 538 (Eff 1-1-97); 146 v S 82 (Eff 3-7-97); 147 v H 215 (Eff 6-30-97); 147 v H 850 (Eff 3-18-99); 148 v H 470 (Eff 7-1-2000); 149 v H 386 (Eff 5-24-2002); 149 v S 138. Eff 6-18-2002.
Å Division (A)(1), last paragraph, RC § 4123.44.2 was amended and renumbered to RC § 4123.44.1 in 145 v H 107, eff 10-20-93.
Comment, Legislative Service Commission
Sections * * * and 119.01 of the Revised Code are amended by this act [Sub. S.B. 386] and also by Am. Sub. H.B. 138, both of the 124th General Assembly. Comparison of these amendments in pursuance of section 1.52 of the Revised Code discloses that they are not irreconcilable so that they are required by that section to be harmonized to give effect to each amendment.
Text Discussion
Appeal under the Administrative Procedure Act. 6 Ohio Civ. Prac. § 312.02
Appeals from the Liquor Control Commission. 6 Ohio Civ. Prac. § 312.08
Civil service appeals. 6 Ohio Civ. Prac. § 312.10
Research Aids
Definitions:
O-Jur3d: Admin L §§ 6, 7, 81, 147, 149, 150
Am-Jur2d: Admin L § 1
ALR
"Agency," what constitutes within meaning of Federal Sunshine Act (5 USCS § 552b). 68 ALRFed 842.
What constitutes "good cause" under provision of Administrative Procedure Act (5 USCS § 533(d)(3)) allowing agency rule to become effective less than 30 days after publication. 55 ALRFed 880.
What is an "agency" for purposes of 28 USCS § 1345, granting original jurisdiction to United States District Courts of civil actions by any agency of the United States. 51 ALRFed 874.
Law Review
Administrative adjudications: an overview of the existing models and their failure to achieve uniformity and a proposal for a uniform adjudicatory framework. Comment. 46 Ohio St. L.J. 355 (1985).
Administrative res judicata in Ohio: a suggestion for the future. Comment. 37 Clev. St. L. Rev. 595 (1989).
Administrative review and the Ohio modern courts amendment. Ivan Cate Rutledge. 35 Ohio St. L.J. 41 (1974).
Appellate review of administrative rule making in Ohio - prospects for revival. Robert L. Brubaker, David E. Northrop. 37 Ohio St. L.J. 471 (1976).
A comparative analysis of the federal and Ohio administrative procedure acts. Note. 24 CinLRev 365 (1955).
The continued viability of Ohio's procedure for legislative review of agency rules in the post-Chadha era. Comment. 49 Ohio St. L.J. 251 (1988).
Development of environmental law through the administrative process. Barry H. Smith. 4 CAP. U.L. Rev. 203 (1975).
Due process and the Ohio administrative procedure act: the central panel proposal. Christopher B. McNeil. 23 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 783 (1997).
The Federal APA and state administrative law. Earl Bonfield. 72 VirginiaLRev 297 (1986).
Judicial interpretation of administrative regulations: an overview. Russell L. Weaver. 53 CinLRev 681 (1984).
Judicial review of decisions of the industrial commission of Ohio: Is some evidence a non-existent standard? Ronald T. Bella. 12 UDayLRev 535 (1987).
Legislative control over administrative rule making. Charles H. Melville. 32 CinLRev 33 (1963).
Legislative veto in Ohio: the "twilight zone of distinction." Note. 9 UDayLRev 557 (1984).
Licensing, and administrative procedure acts. Homer W. Giles. 6 ClevMarLRev 301 (1957).
Ohio administrative law and procedure - recent developments. Maurice S. Culp. 14 WestResLRev 765 (1963).
The Ohio division of securities: rule-making, the administrative procedure act and the Ohio securities bulletin. Note. 36 Ohio St. L.J. 662 (1975).
The right of appeal by administrative authority from adverse judicial rulings. Ervin H. Pollack, Harriet S. Martin. 14 Ohio St. L.J. 408 (1953).
Search and seizure - administrative searches - industries not subject to pervasive government regulation. Donovan v. Dewey, 101 SCt 2534 (1981). Note. 9 NoKyLRev 121 (1982).
A survey of the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act. Note. 22 Clev. St. L. Rev. 337 (1973).
CASE NOTES AND OAG
Analysis
Generally.
"Adjudication" construed.
Appeal.
"Agency" construed.
Appeals.
Attorney fees.
Civil service.
Court of claims.
Due process.
Explanatory documents.
Hearing.
Implied powers of agency.
Individual order.
Internal management rules.
Legislative intent.
"License" construed.
License revocation.
Notice requirements.
"Party" construed.
Pre-adjudication hearing.
Public policy.
Public utilities commission.
Racing commission.
Real estate division.
Rehabilitation and correction department.
Revocation of permit.
"Rule" construed.
Rules by adjudication.
State employment relations board.
Administrative rules are not an unlawful delegation of legislative authority where the legislature properly confines the scope of rulemaking. The "guidelines" concerning the educational management information system are not "rules" under RC Chapter 119. Revised Code § 3301.07.14, OAC 3301-14-01 and the guidelines establishing EMIS are not preempted by or in conflict with FEPRA: Princeton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio State Bd. of Edn., 96 Ohio App. 3d 558, 645 N.E.2d 773 (1994).
The tax commissioner's special instruction No. 21 concerning computation of an interstate carrier's Ohio corporate franchise tax liability is an RC § 119.01(C) rule and is therefore invalid in that it was not promulgated in accordance with the statutory provisions for administrative rules: McLean Trucking Co. v. Lindley, 70 Ohio St. 2d 106, 24 Ohio Op. 3d 187, 435 N.E.2d 414 (1982).
The Ohio Civil Rights Commission is not required to comply with RC Chapter 119.: Plumbers & Steamfitters v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 66 Ohio St. 2d 192, 20 Ohio Op. 3d 200, 421 N.E.2d 128 (1981).
Where no prejudice is shown, a state agency's failure to follow administrative code rules on dismissals does not invalidate the dismissals: Parfitt v. Correctional Facility, 62 Ohio St. 2d 434, 16 Ohio Op. 3d 455, 406 N.E.2d 528 (1980).
There are three ways in which a state board may be subjected to the administrative procedure act under par. (A) of RC § 119.01, namely: (1) certain boards are specifically named, (2) the legislation concerning a board specifically subjects such board to this act, and (3) a board which has authority to issue, suspend, remove or cancel licenses: In re Martins Ferry Met. Housing Authority, 2 Ohio App. 2d 237, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 365, 207 N.E.2d 672 (1965).
The state board of housing, in a proceeding for enlarging a metropolitan housing authority under RC § 3735.27, is not subject to the administrative procedure act: In re Martins Ferry Metropolitan Housing Authority, 2 Ohio App. 2d 237, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 365, 207 N.E.2d 672 (1965).
A proceeding by the director of highways to relocate a federal aid highway without the consent of the municipality through which such highway is to be relocated is not governed by the administrative procedure act [RC § 119.01(A)]: City of Lakewood v. Thormyer, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 61, 80 Ohio L. Ab. 65, 154 N.E.2d 777 (CP 1958).
A member of the Ohio board of building appeals is prohibited by RC § 102.04(A) from rendering services, for compensation, in regard to offering testimony on proposed equal employment opportunity rules and regulations which are the subject of a proceeding, pursuant to the administrative procedures act, (RC Chapter 119.), which is before the state equal employment opportunity coordinator, department of administrative services: Ohio Ethics Commission Advisory Opinion No. 75-017 (1975).
The amendments made by 129 v 1694 (1697), effective October 24, 1961, to RC § 4112.05(G) and (I), making certain procedures of the Ohio civil rights commission subject to the administrative procedure act, RC § 119.01 et seq, have the effect of making said chapter applicable to procedures of the commission only as they relate to the manner in which final orders of the commission are issued and served on respondents and to modification or reconsideration of final orders of the commission: 1961 OAG No. 2462 (1961).
Under RC § 3301.16 the state board of education in reaching a determination of the qualification of a school for the granting of a high school charter, is governed by RC § 119.01 et seq: 1959 OAG No. 345 (1959).
It is the responsibility of the state board of education in the first instance to determine whether a particular school district, or the board of education of such district, "has not conformed with the law" so as to require the withholding of state funds from such district. In making such determination the state board of education should observe the requirements of the administrative procedure act, RC § 119.01 et seq, as to notice, hearing, summoning of witnesses, presentation of evidence, degree of proof, and procedural matters generally: 1956 OAG No. 6810 (1956).
The division of shore erosion in its functions as defined and imposed in RC Chapter 1507., is not subject to the administrative procedure act: 1954 OAG No. 3437 (1954).
The board of liquor control, being an "agency" as defined in GC § 154-62 (RC § 119.01), may, in the reasonable exercise of its discretion, determine the date, time and place of each adjudication hearing required under either the administrative procedure act, GC § 154-62 (RC § 119.01) et seq, or the Ohio liquor control act, GC § 6064-1 (RC § 4301.01) et seq: 1953 OAG No. 2422 (1953).
The Ohio state board of optometry, by virtue of its possession of licensing powers, is subject to the rules and provisions of the administrative procedure act and must, therefore, follow the procedure prescribed therein for the adoption, filing and promulgation of its rules and regulations: 1950 OAG No. 2340 (1950).
The superintendent of building and loan associations in issuing, suspending, revoking or canceling the certificates provided for in GC §§ 9643-1, 9660-3a, 679 and 690 (RC §§ 1151.03, 1151.38 and 1151.64), is subject to the administrative procedure act: 1945 OAG No. 523 (1945).
In giving or withholding his approval, consent or certificate provided for in GC §§ 693-1, 693-2, 9643-4, 9645, 9649, 9655, 9657, 9660-2, 9660-3, 9660, 9665 and 9670 (RC §§ 1151.61, 1151.62, 1151.05, 1151.08, 1151.09, 1151.10, 1151.20, 1151.27, 1151.29, 1151.36, 1151.37, 1151.34, 1151.45 and 1151.49), the superintendent of building and loan associations is not subject to the administrative procedure act: 1945 OAG No. 523 (1945).
The transportation director's letters were not "adjudication orders" where the denial was indicated as preliminary and the right to a hearing prior to a final determination was noted: Hurst v. Liberty-Bel, Inc., 117 Ohio App. 3d 138, 690 N.E.2d 40 (1997).
The order issuing a permit was an "adjudication," not a "rule," because it did not have general application: State ex rel. Fisher v. Nacelle Land & Mgt. Corp., 90 Ohio App. 3d 93, 628 N.E.2d 67 (1993).
The act of suspending a provider pursuant to OAC 4123-7-41 is not ministerial in nature and is an adjudication under RC § 119.01(D) and the result of a quasi-judicial proceeding under OConst art IV, § 4: In the matter of Seltzer, No. 91AP-677 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 2637 (10th Dist. 1992).
To constitute an "adjudication" for purposes of RC § 119.12, a determination must be (1) that of the highest or ultimate authority of an agency which (2) determines the rights, privileges, benefits, or other legal relationships of a person: Russell v. Harrison Twp., 75 Ohio App. 3d 643, 600 N.E.2d 374 (1991).
The determination, by letter, of the Director of Transportation, pursuant to RC Chapter 5516., to deny a permit to advertise off-premise businesses on a billboard outside an urban area is an "adjudication" within the meaning of RC § 119.01(D), and may be appealed to the proper court of common pleas pursuant to RC § 119.12: Liberty Bell, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 34 Ohio App. 3d 267, 518 N.E.2d 32 (1986).
The determination of a petitioner's right to an operator's license, or reinstatement thereof, constitutes an "adjudication" as defined by RC § 119.01(D), and petitioner has available the administrative and appeal remedies provided by RC Chapter 119.: Stieben v. Dollison, 8 Ohio App. 3d 188, 8 Ohio B. 248, 456 N.E.2d 842 (1983).
Revised Code § 5101.51.4(B) does not provide a right to a pretermination hearing where a provider agreement is terminated because HEW has declared the provider ineligible for participation in the Medicare program. In such case the act of the department of public welfare terminating the agreement is purely ministerial in nature and not an adjudication as defined in RC § 119.01(D): New London Hospital v. Creasy, 18 Ohio Op. 3d 201 (App 1980).
In the absence of an "adjudication" as defined in RC § 119.01(D), the right to notice and hearing does not obtain and, consequently, in such a case the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County lacks jurisdiction under RC § 119.12 to review actions taken by a state administrative agency (Fortner v. Thomas, 22 OS2d 13, 51 OO2d 35; M. J. Kelley Co. v. Cleveland, 32 OS2d 150, 61 OO2d 394, approved and followed): State ex rel. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn., 53 Ohio St. 2d 173, 7 Ohio Op. 3d 357, 373 N.E.2d 1238 (1978).
The refusal of the State Board of Education to grant a local school district an additional exemption to the requirements of RC § 3311.29 does not constitute an "adjudication" within the meaning of RC § 119.01(D): State ex rel. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn., 53 Ohio St. 2d 173, 7 Ohio Op. 3d 357, 373 N.E.2d 1238 (1978).
A notice that an examination would be held to determine the competency of the holder of a driver's license, pursuant to RC § 4507.20, absent an order of revocation or suspension, is not an adjudication or appealable order within the meaning of RC § 119.01: Davison v. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 46 Ohio App. 2d 86, 75 Ohio Op. 2d 74, 345 N.E.2d 619 (1975).
The state board of education, in making the determination required by RC § 3311.06, as to an equitable division of the funds and indebtedness between school districts involved in a transfer of territory, is not subject to the provisions of the administrative procedure act (RC Chapter 119.); the action of the state board of education in such matter is final, and a school district board of education may not appeal therefrom: State ex rel. Bd. of Education v. State Bd. of Education, 110 Ohio App. 527, 13 Ohio Op. 2d 343, 82 Ohio L. Ab. 495, 166 N.E.2d 253 (1959).
The Ohio expositions commission was not a state agency subject to RC Chapter 119.: Abt v. Ohio Expositions Comm., 110 Ohio App. 3d 696, 675 N.E.2d 43 (1996).
A state psychiatric hospital is not an "agency" under RC § 119.01: Arbogast v. Peterson, 91 Ohio App. 3d 22, 631 N.E.2d 673 (1993).
The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction is not an agency whose decisions are subject to judicial review by appeal pursuant to RC § 119.12: Augustine v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. and Corr., 3 Ohio App. 3d 398, 3 Ohio B. 464, 445 N.E.2d 706 (1981).
Ohio State University is not an agency within the meaning of RC Chapter 119.: Bd. of Trustees v. Dept. of Admin. Services, 68 Ohio St. 2d 149, 22 Ohio Op. 3d 383, 429 N.E.2d 428 (1981).
Section 461.2 of the Ohio public assistance manual, which makes available a special dietary allowance to persons receiving aid for the aged but specifically denies such allowance to persons receiving aid to disabled persons, is not a "rule" within the purview of RC § 119.01 (the administrative procedure act), and the department of public welfare is not an "agency" thereunder or subject to the act: Lehew v. Rhodes, 23 Ohio App. 2d 102, 52 Ohio Op. 2d 120, 261 N.E.2d 280 (1970).
The public health council is an "agency" within the meaning of the administrative procedure act, with authority to adopt rules and regulations for nursing homes: Ohio State Federation of Nursing Homes v. Public Health Council, 172 Ohio St. 227, 15 Ohio Op. 2d 375, 174 N.E.2d 251 (1961).
The state board of examiners of architects of the state of Ohio is a board subject to the provisions of RC Chapter 119., commonly referred to as the administrative procedure act: State ex rel. Burchard v. State Board of Examiners, 110 Ohio App. 286, 13 Ohio Op. 2d 43, 82 Ohio L. Ab. 117, 163 N.E.2d 391 (App 1959).
The definition of "agency" in RC § 119.01, includes "civil service commission": Owens v. Ackerman, 72 Ohio L. Ab. 552, 136 N.E.2d 93 (App 1955).
Both the board of liquor control and the department of liquor control are agencies as defined in GC § 154-62 (RC § 119.01): Detelich v. Department of Liquor Control, 62 Ohio L. Ab. 195, 107 N.E.2d 415 (App 1950).
Disciplinary orders issued by the self-insuring employers evaluation board pursuant to RC § 4123.35.2(C) are not subject to judicial review under RC § 119.12 of the administrative procedure act: Baltimore Ravens, Inc. v. Self-Insuring Emp. Evaluation Bd., 94 Ohio St. 3d 449, 764 N.E.2d 418 (2002).
Revocation of a Type B day-care certificate is appealable pursuant to RC Chapter 119.: McAtee v. Ottawa Cty. Dept. of Human Serv., 111 Ohio App. 3d 812, 677 N.E.2d 395 (1996).
The common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over a challenge to boiler classifications made in an administrative rule. Also, the plaintiffs, stationary engineers, lacked standing: Nielsen v. Ford Motor Co., 113 Ohio App. 3d 495, 681 N.E.2d 470 (1996).
Orders of the Administrator of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, issued pursuant to RC § 4121.44(R), are not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, RC Chapter 119.: In re Seltzer, 67 Ohio St. 3d 220, 616 N.E.2d 1108 (1993).
A finding by a district hearing officer on the issue of continued temporary total compensation is not, in view of the right to appeal under RC § 4123.51.6, a determination "by the highest or ultimate authority" of the commission. Thus, procedures governing this area are not exempt from RC Chapter 119. requirements: State ex rel. Eaton Corp. v. Lancaster, 40 Ohio St. 3d 404, 534 N.E.2d 46 (1988).
An appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County from an order of the Board of Building Standards denying an individual's application for approval as the chief building official for a municipal building department is governed by RC Chapters 119. and 3781. Revised Code Chapter 2506. has no application to such an appeal: Wahle v. Dept. of Indus. Relations, 14 Ohio App. 3d 101, 14 Ohio B. 105, 470 N.E.2d 200 (1983).
Although a church, which wants to protest the issuance of a liquor permit, may be entitled to a hearing pursuant to RC § 4303.26, neither RC Chapter 4303. nor Chapter 119. authorize the church to appeal the subsequent decision of the Director of Liquor Control concerning the liquor permit application to the Court of Common Pleas: Ninth Street Church v. Reich, 1 Ohio App. 3d 141, 1 Ohio B. 449, 439 N.E.2d 958 (1981).
After a decision of an administrative board is appealed, the board loses its jurisdiction to reconsider its decision. Thus, where an appeal from an order of the environmental board of review is still pending in the court of appeals, a writ of prohibition will issue to prevent the board from attempting to act in what is essentially the same cause: State ex rel. Republic Steel Corp. v. Board of Review, 54 Ohio St. 2d 75, 8 Ohio Op. 3d 79, 374 N.E.2d 1355 (1978).
The review of final orders or actions of administrative officers or agencies authorized by OConst art IV, § 3(B)(2) enables the general assembly to confer upon the Courts of Appeals appellate jurisdiction to review the final orders of administrative officers or agencies, irrelative of the fact that it is an appeal from an administrative rule-making action: Williams v. Akron, 54 Ohio St. 2d 136, 8 Ohio Op. 3d 125, 374 N.E.2d 1378 (1978).
The director of a state department does not have a right of appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County from an order of the State Personnel Board of Review disaffirming the director's layoff order of an employee for alleged lack of work. (RC §§ 119.01 and 119.12) (Corn v. Board of Liquor Control, 160 OS 9, 50 OO 479; Lindblom v. Board of Tax Appeals, 151 OS 250, 39 OO 66, paragraph two of the syllabus, approved and followed.): State ex rel. Osborn v. Jackson, 46 Ohio St. 2d 41, 75 Ohio Op. 2d 132, 346 N.E.2d 141 (1976).
Since the school employees retirement board is not one of the specified agencies enumerated in RC § 119.01(A), and, since there is no statutory provision making RC Chapter 119. applicable to orders or adjudications by that board, there is no remedy by way of administrative appeal, pursuant to RC § 119.12, from an order or adjudication of the school employees retirement board: Fair v. School Employees Retire. System, 44 Ohio App. 2d 115, 73 Ohio Op. 2d 101, 335 N.E.2d 868 (1975).
A decision of the state personnel board of review affirming an order of an appointing authority "laying off" an employee in the classified service of the state is a final appealable order, and, pursuant to the provisions of RC Chapter 119., such employee may appeal therefrom to the court of common pleas of Franklin county: State ex rel. Kendrick v. Masheter, 120 Ohio App. 168, 28 Ohio Op. 2d 426, 201 N.E.2d 707 (1963).
An "appointing authority" has no right of appeal to the common pleas court from a decision of the state personnel board of review disaffirming a job-abolishment by such "appointing authority": In re Job Abolishment of Jenkins, 120 Ohio App. 385, 29 Ohio Op. 2d 247, 202 N.E.2d 634 (1963).
Proceedings before the state personnel board of review, and on appeal from such board, are governed by the administrative procedure act: Graul v. Board of Review, 117 Ohio App. 108, 23 Ohio Op. 2d 216, 191 N.E.2d 188 (1962).
On appeal from an order of an agency (as defined in RC § 119.01) to the court of common pleas, the power of the court to modify such order is limited to the ground set forth in RC § 119.12, i.e., the absence of a finding that the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence: Henry's Cafe, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 170 Ohio St. 233, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 177, 163 N.E.2d 678 (1959).
"Civil service commission" as used in RC § 119.01, includes both state and municipal civil service commission, thus a municipal civil service commission has the right to appeal from an adverse ruling of the court of common pleas involving the removal from duty of a police officer: Owens v. Ackerman, 72 Ohio L. Ab. 552, 136 N.E.2d 93 (App 1955).
The "civil service commission" is designated by RC § 119.01 as one of the agencies which may take an appeal from the judgment of the court of common pleas under authority of RC § 119.12: Owens v. Ackerman, 72 Ohio L. Ab. 552, 136 N.E.2d 93 (App 1955).
The administrative procedure act (RC § 119.01 [GC § 154-62] et seq) did not confer upon the director of education and the high school board the right to appeal from a judgment of the court of common pleas rendered on appeal from an order of the department of education: In re Millcreek Local Dist. High School, 160 Ohio St. 234, 52 Ohio Op. 91, 115 N.E.2d 840 (1953).
The Ohio Civil Rights Commission is not an "agency" for purposes of RC § 119.09.2, concerning awards of attorney fees in connection with adjudication hearings: State ex rel. Auglaize Community Action Comm., Inc. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 73 Ohio St. 3d 723, 654 N.E.2d 1250 (1995).
A municipal civil service commission, not being an "agency" as defined by RC § 119.01, is not subject to the provisions of the administrative procedure act in promulgating rules: Karrick v. Board of Education, 174 Ohio St. 467, 23 Ohio Op. 2d 114, 190 N.E.2d 256 (1963).
A person who becomes chief of police of a city without taking the civil service examination required by law is not in the classified service, is not entitled to the benefits of the civil service law, and has no right of appeal to the municipal civil service commission from an order of removal by the mayor of the city or to the common pleas court from a decision of the municipal civil service commission affirming the mayor's removal order: In re Taylor, 172 Ohio St. 394, 16 Ohio Op. 2d 248, 176 N.E.2d 214 (1961).
The reference in RC § 119.01 to the civil service commission is to the state civil service commission and not to a municipal civil service commission: In re Taylor, 172 Ohio St. 394, 16 Ohio Op. 2d 248, 249, 176 N.E.2d 214 (1961).
The civil service commission is an "agency" as defined by RC § 119.01 and its orders are appealable to the court of common pleas under authority of RC § 119.12: State ex rel. Oliver v. State Civil Service Comm., 168 Ohio St. 445, 7 Ohio Op. 2d 275, 155 N.E.2d 897 (1959).
The availability of administrative remedies has no effect upon the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims: Crestwood Nursing Home v. White, 52 Ohio App. 2d 274, 6 Ohio Op. 3d 282, 369 N.E.2d 804 (1977).
Revised Code § 2743.02(A), of the court of claims act, states, "... To the extent that the state has previously consented to be sued, this chapter has no applicability." A remedy for one wrongfully denied a nursing home license is provided by RC § 119.01 et seq., the administrative procedure act. Thus the court of claims lacks jurisdiction over such a claim: Marshall Nursing Home v. Ackerman, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 143 (App 1976).
The Court of Claims has no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Department of Public Welfare: Bolin v. White, 51 Ohio App. 2d 92, 5 Ohio Op. 3d 244, 367 N.E.2d 63 (1976).
Ohio Liquor Control Commission did not violate due process under RC § 119.01 et seq. in revoking the former licensee's liquor license, as the commission issued a notice of hearing, and the notice included a detailed description of the alleged violations and the possible penalties for such violations. Consun Food Indus. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm'n, - Ohio App. 3d - , - N.E.2d - 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 4212 (Sept. 4, 2003).
Industrial commission Memo E-7 does not constitute a rule subject to RC Chapter 119. Documents that explain rather than expand fall outside those provisions: State ex rel. Saunders v. Indus. Comm., 101 Ohio St. 3d 125 (2004).
Revised Code § 4731.34.1 is an independent special statute which expressly provides for an injunction action to abate a public nuisance, the unlawful practice of medicine; it does not provide for an administrative hearing as a condition precedent to the injunction action: State Medical Bd. v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, 8 Ohio App. 3d 105, 8 Ohio B. 139, 456 N.E.2d 577 (1983).
The state board of pharmacy's authority to promulgate rules regulating the practice of pharmacy and the distribution of dangerous drugs includes implied powers, such as issuing opinion letters interpreting and applying its rules: OPUS III-VII Corp. v. Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy, 109 Ohio App. 3d 102, 671 N.E.2d 1087 (1996).
There are circumstances which arise where an agency is justified in acting by individual order rather than by general rule: (1) situations that could not reasonably be foreseen; (2) problems which must be solved despite the absence of a relevant general rule; and (3) insufficient experience with the particular problem to warrant rigidifying a tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule; and (4) problems so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible to capture within the boundaries of a general rule: Dressler Coal Corp. v. Call, 4 Ohio App. 3d 81, 4 Ohio B. 161, 446 N.E.2d 785 (1981).
The BMV license reinstatement center policy limiting the number of applications an agent could submit at one time was an "internal management rule" for purposes of RC § 119.01: State ex rel. Savage v. Caltrider, 100 Ohio St. 3d 363 (2003).
Superintendent's policy of considering only fifteen applications at each meeting is a regulation concerning internal management of the agency, not an administrative rule: State ex rel. Life of Maryland, Inc. v. Katz, 4 Ohio St. 3d 140, 4 Ohio B. 384, 447 N.E.2d 116 (1983).
The fiscal analysis of OAC 3745-1-26 filed by the director of Environmental Protection, which rule designated a segment of the lower Cuyahoga River as a marine life warmwater habitat complies with RC Chapter 119. The legislative intent of RC Chapter 119. is to provide an opportunity for opponents of a proposed regulation to express their views as to the wisdom of the proposal and to present evidence with respect to its illegality: Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer Dist. v. Shank, 58 Ohio St. 3d 16, 567 N.E.2d 993 (1991).
Certification of a health care provider by ODH for compliance with federal Medicaid requirements constitutes a "license" for purposes of RC § 119.12; it is not an arrangement whereby a person, institution, or entity furnishes Medicaid services under a provider agreement with ODHS: Bayside Nursing Center v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 96 Ohio App. 3d 754, 645 N.E.2d 1314 (1994).
The duties of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles under RC Chapter 4507., including RC § 4507.08(A), with respect to operator's licenses as defined by RC § 4507.01, constitute the exercise of licensing functions within the contemplation of RC § 119.01(A): Stieben v. Dollison, 8 Ohio App. 3d 188, 8 Ohio B. 248, 456 N.E.2d 842 (1983).
The action of the Superintendent of Banks approving a branch application constitutes an exercise by an agency of a licensing function and is appealable pursuant to RC Chapter 119. to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County. Any bank receiving notice of a branch bank application pursuant to RC Chapter 1111. is a proper party to bring an appeal of the approval of the application by the Superintendent of Banks pursuant to RC Chapter 119.: Genoa Banking Co. v. Mills, 67 Ohio St. 2d 106, 21 Ohio Op. 3d 67, 423 N.E.2d 161 (1981).
The approval of an application by a building and loan association to operate a branch office pursuant to RC § 1151.05 is not a licensing function within the provisions of the administrative procedure act (RC Chapter 119.): Home Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Boesch, 41 Ohio St. 2d 115, 70 Ohio Op. 2d 204, 322 N.E.2d 878 (1975).
The permits which the division of shore erosion is empowered to grant under the provisions of RC Chapter 1507. are not licenses as that term is used in the administrative procedure act; such permits are only licenses in the sense of an incorporeal hereditament in and to property of the state and are to be negotiated on a contractual basis, in the same manner as employed by other bodies or officers generally empowered to contract on behalf of the state: 1954 OAG No. 3437 (1954).
A certificate issued by the industrial commission of Ohio pursuant to the provisions of GC § 1465-69 (RC § 4123.35) certifying that the employer named therein has been granted authority by said commission to pay compensation directly to its injured or the dependents of killed employees and that said employer has furnished the necessary bond and has paid the premium required by paragraph 2 of GC § 1465-54 (RC § 4123.34) for the period designated in such certificate, is such a license as will bring the industrial commission in its issuance or revocation within the provisions of the "administrative procedure act," as enacted in Senate Bill 36 by the 95th General Assembly and codified as GC §§ 154-61 to 154-73 (RC § 119.01 et seq): 1943 OAG No. 6458 (1943).
Mandamus does not lie to compel the superintendent of insurance to revoke the license of third persons where relators have not sought an adjudication under the administrative procedure act: State ex rel. Ohio Assn. of Ins. Agents v. Ohio Dept. of Ins., 29 Ohio St. 2d 188, 58 Ohio Op. 2d 401, 281 N.E.2d 9 (1972).
Notice of suspension of a driver's license under the financial responsibility law must comply with the notice requirements of the administrative procedure act: State v. Foreman, 54 Ohio Misc. 31, 7 Ohio Op. 3d 230, 376 N.E.2d 987 (MC 1978).
A state agency is not a "party" under RC § 119.01 with a right of appeal under RC § 119.12: Collyer v. Broadview Developmental Ctr., 74 Ohio App. 3d 99, 598 N.E.2d 75 (1991).
A person who files a complaint with the Ohio motor vehicle dealers board alleging that a dealer's license should be revoked is not a "party" within the meaning of RC § 119.01(G): State ex rel. Barron v. Ohio Motor Vehicle Dealers Bd., 2 Ohio App. 3d 454, 2 Ohio B. 550, 442 N.E.2d 799 (1981).
A target company which has requested a hearing pursuant to RC § 1707.04.1(B)(1)(a) is a party to the adjudication order of the division of securities with respect to the takeover bid, and, if the order be adverse to the target company, it is a party adversely affected, having a right of appeal from the order pursuant to RC § 119.12. The offeror is a party-appellee to such an appeal even though it is not notified of the appeal by the appellant: Babcock & Wilcox Company v. Hurd, 5 Ohio Op. 3d 408 (App 1977).
Where an application for a charitable bingo license is rejected on the basis that an investigation revealed numerous prior violations, the applicant is entitled to a pre-adjudication hearing: Boys Town v. Brown, 69 Ohio St. 2d 1, 23 Ohio Op. 3d 1, 429 N.E.2d 1171 (1981).
Administrative regulations cannot dictate public policy but rather can only develop and administer policy already established by the general assembly: D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health, 96 Ohio St. 3d 250, 2002-Ohio-4172, 773 N.E.2d 536 (2002).
The administrative procedure act, by RC § 119.01, specifically exempts the public utilities commission from the provisions of the act, and the commission has no authority to promulgate a rule under such act: Akron & Barberton Belt R. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 165 Ohio St. 316, 59 Ohio Op. 410, 135 N.E.2d 400 (1956).
The administrative procedure act, GC § 154-62 (RC § 119.01) et seq., sets up a formal procedure for rule-making, but by RC § 119.01, the public utilities commission is specially excepted from the provisions of the act: Craun Transp., Inc. v. Public Util. Comm., 162 Ohio St. 9, 53 Ohio Op. 451, 120 N.E.2d 436 (1954).
A charge that a licensed race horse owner violated Ohio state racing commission Rule 65, which permits license revocation "for conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing" in that he "was on the premises of... race track without authorization in the stall of" a certain horse and that such "unauthorized presence" "constituted improper practice on the part of a racing commission license holder," relates directly to the conduct of horse racing and is supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence where witnesses testify to seeing him in the stable area and in the stable of such horse on the date alleged and he admits being in such stable area about the time in question: In re Cline, 3 Ohio App. 2d 345, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 461, 210 N.E.2d 737 (1964).
As to complaints filed against licensees subject to regulation by the Ohio Division of Real Estate, the provisions of RC Chapter 4735. specifically governing Division of Real Estate proceedings prevail over any conflicting general hearing requirements of RC Chapter 119. In proceedings held pursuant to RC Chapter 4735., the more specific time provisions of RC § 4735.05.1, as they apply to time of hearing and submission of hearing examiner reports, prevail over those articulated in RC Chapter 119.; however, the due process protections of RC Chapter 119. regarding the contents of the letter providing notice of a right to a hearing and the filing and consideration of objections to the hearing examiner's report and recommendations are applicable, since RC Chapter 4735. does not speak specifically to those matters: OAG No. 80-092 (1980).
Rehabilitation and correction department
The department of rehabilitation and correction is not an agency whose decisions are subject to judicial review pursuant to RC § 119.12: State v. Brown, 156 Ohio App. 3d 120 (2004).
The revocation of a permit granted under the provisions of RC Chapter 1507. is governed by, and dependent upon, the terms and provisions of the permit which is, in essence, a contract: 1954 OAG No. 3437 (1954).
The "interpretation" by the board of dietetics that RC § 4759.06(D) required a college course in chemistry for a degree to qualify as being in "another related field acceptable to the board" was a "rule" under RC § 119.01(C) because it was to have a general and uniform operation: Livisay v. Ohio Bd. of Dietetics, 73 Ohio App. 3d 288, 596 N.E.2d 1129 (1991).
A "position paper" which permits regulated persons to perform certain procedures should be "rule-filed" pursuant to RC Chapter 119. since it is tantamount to a rule no matter how it is characterized: Ohio Nurses Assoc., Inc. v. Ohio State Bd. of Nursing Edn. & Nurse Registration, 44 Ohio St. 3d 73, 540 N.E.2d 1354 (1989).
The tax commissioner's informal instruction as to the 70/30 apportionment of situsable utility property was in fact a rule and thus invalid, as not adopted in accordance with RC §§ 119.01 et seq. and 5703.14: Condee v. Lindley, 12 Ohio St. 3d 90, 12 Ohio B. 79, 465 N.E.2d 450 (1984).
The state medical board may, in the reasonable exercise of its informed discretion, promulgate rules by adjudication: Marion OB/GYN, Inc. v. State Med. Bd., 137 Ohio App. 3d 522, 739 N.E.2d 15 (2000).
State employment relations board
A decision of the SERB not to file a complaint after an investigation pursuant to RC § 4117.12 is not a final, appealable order because the investigation was a ministerial function. The decision to prosecute or not to prosecute a claim is purely executory and nonjudicial function: Boieru v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 54 Ohio App. 3d 23, 560 N.E.2d 801 (1988).
An order of the State Employment Relations Board certifying a bargaining unit, over objections that the employees in question are not "public employees" under RC § 4117.01(C)(10), is an "adjudication" within the meaning of RC § 119.01(D) and as such is a final appealable order within the meaning of RC § 2505.02. (South Community, Inc. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. [1988], 38 OS3d 224, 527 NE2d 864, followed.): Hudson Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 42 Ohio App. 3d 118, 536 N.E.2d 1197 (1988).
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